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Abstract
Building on the game-theoretic framework for probability, we show
that it is possible, using randomization, to make sequential probability
forecasts that will pass any given battery of statistical tests. This result,
an easy consequence of von Neumann’s minimax theorem, simplifies and
generalizes work by earlier authors.
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1 Introduction
In a recent book (Shafer and Vovk, 2001), we introduced a purely game-theoretic
framework for probability theory. In this article, we build on that framework
to demonstrate the possibility of good probability forecasting.
In Section 2, we review the prototypical game studied in our book. One of
the players, a sceptic, bets repeatedly at odds given by a probability forecaster.
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The sceptic can become infinitely rich unless reality respects the forecaster’s
odds over the long run. In Section 3, we formulate a game that better repre-
sents the challenge faced by the forecaster, as opposed to the sceptic. In this
new game, which we did not consider in our book, the forecaster faces a sceptic
whose strategy is revealed in advance, and he is allowed to use a degree of ran-
domization to conceal each of his probability forecasts until the corresponding
outcome has been announced. Our main result, stated and proven in Section 4,
says that the forecaster can keep the sceptic from becoming infinitely rich, no
matter how reality chooses the outcomes. This means that relative to the scep-
tic’s strategy, the outcomes will look like random events with the forecasted
probabilities. This result is an easy consequence of von Neumann’s minimax
theorem, but it is somewhat surprising. As we explain in Section 5, it sug-
gests that we can make an arbitrary sequential process in the real world look
stochastic in any specified respect.
In the usual measure-theoretic framework for probability, an asymptotic sta-
tistical test can be defined by specifying an event of probability zero; the test
is passed if the event does not happen (Martin-Lo¨f 1966). In our framework, a
statistical test is a betting strategy for the sceptic; the test is passed if the scep-
tic does not become infinitely rich. Because we consider any betting strategy for
sceptic (any statistical test), our result strengthens earlier results in Foster and
Vohra (1998), Fudenberg and Levine (1999), Lehrer (2001), and Sandroni et al.
(2003). These articles made weaker demands on the forecaster; instead of requir-
ing that the probabilities he gives as forecasts pass any statistical test, Foster
and Vohra asked only that the entire sequence of probabilities be properly cali-
brated, and the other authors added only the demand that certain subsequences
also be properly calibrated. A sequence of probabilities is properly calibrated
when the difference between the average of the probabilities and the observed
relative frequency of the events being forecast converges to zero; for a precise
statement see equations (4) and (6) below. When calibration fails, whether on
the entire sequence or on a subsequence, a statistical test has been failed. But
as Ville (1939) demonstrated, there are other statistical tests that go beyond
calibration (see also Li and Vita´nyi 1997, p. 313). We can check, for example,
whether the convergence required by calibration is at the rate required the law
of the iterated logarithm
In the measure-theoretic framework, violation of the law of the iterated
logarithm is an event of probability zero. In our framework, there is a betting
strategy for sceptic that makes him infinitely rich when it happens (Shafer and
Vovk 2001, Chapter 5).
So far as mathematical technique is concerned, this article holds little nov-
elty, for our argument from the minimax theorem was already used by some of
the authors concerned with proper calibration (Foster and Vohra 1998, Fuden-
berg 1999, Sandroni et al. 2003). Our contribution is to put the argument in
our game-theoretic framework and to show that it can lead to forecasts with
stochastic properties going beyond calibration. The earlier articles we have cited
did not quite exhaust the argument’s potential even for calibration. As we show
in Appendix A (see the comments preceding Theorem 5), our result implies a
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general statement about tests of calibration that is stronger and simpler than
the strongest previous statement, the one given by Sandroni et al. (2003).
In another recent article, Sandroni (2003) has given a measure-theoretic
version of our result. As we show in Appendix B, Sandroni’s result can be
derived quite easily, modulo technicalities, from our Theorem 4. It is less general
than our Theorem 4 in several respects, most notably in that it makes the
restrictive assumption that outcomes are generated by a probability measure.
Our result also has philosophical significance beyond that of the earlier work,
because it goes beyond calibration to questions about the meaning of probability.
Within the game-theoretic framework, the requirement that probabilities resist
any betting strategy defines their very meaning. Some readers might consider
calibration equally fundamental, arguing that the project of properly calibrating
subsequences is in the spirit of the frequentist foundation of probability advanced
by von Mises (1919), and it is true that von Mises’s approach is still sometimes
presented as a legitimate competitor to interpretations of probability based on
betting. But as Ville (1939) pointed out, it is deficient because it does not require
as much irregularity as classical probability theory does. A sequence satisfying
von Mises’s conditions satisfies the law of large numbers, but it need not satisfy
other predictions of probability theory, such as the law of the iterated logarithm.
Our game-theoretic framework provides one way, in our judgement the simplest
way formulated to date, of correcting this deficiency. From our point of view,
the work on properly calibrated forecasting that we are extending stays too
close to von Mises, and this makes it unnecessarily complex. As we see it, the
story is simpler in the game-theoretic framework. For more on the historical
background of the game-theoretic framework, see Shafer and Vovk (2004), Vovk
and Shafer (2004) and Chapter 2 of Shafer and Vovk (2001).
2 The game-theoretic framework for probability
In this section, we review the elements of our game-theoretic framework, with
an emphasis on the idea of probability forecasting. For a review of earlier work
on probability forecasting, see Dawid (1986).
Probability forecasting can be thought of as a game with two players, Fore-
caster and Reality. On each round, Forecaster gives probabilities for what Re-
ality will do. Assuming, for simplicity, that Reality makes a binary choice on
each round, we might begin our description of the game with this protocol:
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Forecaster announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
This is a perfect-information protocol; the players move in the order indicated,
and each player sees the other player’s moves as they are made. The players
may also receive other information as play proceeds; we make no assumption
about what other information each player does or does not receive.
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Forecaster’s goal, broadly conceived, is to state probabilities that pass all
possible statistical tests in light of Reality’s subsequent moves. To formalize this
goal, we add a third player, Sceptic, who seeks to refute Forecaster’s probabili-
ties. Sceptic is allowed to bet at the odds defined by Forecaster’s probabilities,
and he refutes the probabilities if he gets infinitely rich. This produces a fully
specified perfect-information game:
Binary Forecasting Game I
Players: Forecaster, Sceptic, Reality
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Forecaster announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Sceptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn − pn).
Restriction on Sceptic: Sceptic must choose Mn so that his capital remains
nonnegative (Kn ≥ 0) no matter what value Reality announces for xn.
Winner: Sceptic wins if Kn tends to infinity. Otherwise Forecaster wins.
This protocol specifies both an initial value for Sceptic’s capital (K0 = 1) and
a lower bound on its subsequent values (Kn ≥ 0). The asymptotic conclusions
we draw about the game will not change if these numbers are changed, but
some lower bound is needed in order to prevent Sceptic from recouping losses
by borrowing ever more money to make ever larger bets.
An internal strategy for one of the players in this game is a rule that tells
the player how to move on each round based on the previous moves by the other
players. The word “internal” here refers to the fact that the strategy uses only
information internal to the game, ignoring other information the player might
receive. We call an internal strategy for Sceptic legal if it respects the condition
that Sceptic move so that his capital always remains nonnegative, no matter
how the other players move.
In the game as we have defined it, Forecaster and Sceptic have opposite
goals. One of them wins, and the other loses. We have not assigned a goal to
Reality, but she is in a position to determine which of the other two players wins.
The exact sense in which this is true is spelled out in the next two theorems.
Making Forecaster win is easy; Reality can do this even without Forecaster’s
cooperation:
Theorem 1 Reality has an internal strategy that assures that Forecaster wins.
Proof Consider the strategy for Reality that always sets
xn :=
{
1 if Mn ≤ 0
0 if Mn > 0.
When Reality follows this strategy, Sceptic’s capital increment Mn(xn − pn) is
never positive and so his capital cannot tend to infinity.
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Making Sceptic win is harder, because Sceptic can keep himself from winning
by never betting (always setting Mn := 0). But if Sceptic makes large enough
bets, Reality can assure that he wins. If Sceptic and Reality cooperate closely,
they can assure that Sceptic wins spectacularly:
Theorem 2 Sceptic and Reality can jointly assure that Sceptic wins. More
precisely, there is a legal internal strategy for Sceptic and an internal strategy
for Reality such that Sceptic wins when the two players follow these strategies.
Proof Consider the strategies that call for Sceptic to announce
Mn :=
{
Kn−1/(1− p) if pn < 0.5
−Kn−1/p otherwise,
and for Reality to announce
xn :=
{
1 if pn < 0.5
0 otherwise.
The strategy for Sceptic is legal, and when Sceptic and Reality follow these
strategies, Sceptic’s capital doubles on each round.
The simple argument in this proof has goes back at least to Putnam (1963); see
Dawid’s comments in Oakes (1985).
Because Reality can largely determine the winner, the following hypothesis
is a nonvacuous prediction about Reality’s behaviour:
Hypothesis of the Excluded Gambling System: No matter
how Sceptic plays, Reality will play so that Sceptic does not win the
game.
This hypothesis is not a mathematical assumption. Rather, it is a way of con-
necting our mathematical formalism, a formal game, with the real world, where
the xn appear. It provides an interpretation in the real world of the probabilities
pn.
When we adopt the hypothesis of the excluded gambling system in a partic-
ular real-world forecasting setup, we are expressing confidence in the theory or
the person supplying the probabilities. Of course, we never adopt it more than
provisionally. When we do adopt it, we say that a property E of the sequence
p1x2p2x2 . . . happens almost surely in the game-theoretic sense if Sceptic has an
internal strategy that wins the game whenever the actual sequence p1x2p2x2 . . .
fails to satisfy E.
In Shafer and Vovk (2001), we justify the hypothesis of the excluded gam-
bling strategy by showing that it gives meaning to the classical predictions of
probability theory. Consider, for simplicity, a probability measure P on {0, 1}∞
that assigns non-zero probability to every finite sequence x1 . . . xn. Suppose
Forecaster uses P ’s conditional probabilities as his moves,
pn := P (xn = 1 | x1, . . . , xn−1), (1)
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and suppose E is a measurable subset of {0, 1}∞. Then, as we show in Sec-
tion 8.1 of (Shafer and Vovk 2001):
1. If P (E) = 0, then Sceptic has a legal internal strategy that wins the game
if E happens.
2. If P (E) > 0, then Sceptic does not have such a strategy.
In other words, an event happens almost surely in the game-theoretic sense if
and only if it has probability one.
These results for the binary case go back to Ville (1939), but we show that
they generalize to more general forecasting games. Instead of having Reality
choose from {0, 1}, we can have her choose from some other measurable space
Ω. Forecaster’s moves will then come from P(Ω), the set of all probability
measures on Ω, and Sceptic will gamble on each round by choosing a payoff that
has zero or perhaps negative expected value with respect to the measure chosen
by Forecaster on that round. (See, for example, the Randomization Subgame
described in Section 3.2.) In this case as in the binary case, Reality must avoid
any given set of probability zero in order to keep Sceptic from becoming infinitely
rich.
Historically, the principle that a given set of small or zero probability will not
happen has been considered fundamental to the interpretation of probability by
many authors, including Kolmogorov (1933). It is sometimes called Cournot’s
principle (Shafer and Vovk 2004). Within our game-theoretic framework, we
use Cournot’s principle as another name for our hypothesis of the excluded
gambling system.
We conclude this brief review of the game-theoretic framework with these
clarifications:
1. Because they allow Reality to play strategically and even collaborate with
other players, our games diverge from the usual picture of stochastic pro-
cesses, in which the outcome is not thought to be affected by how anyone is
betting. But the principal mathematical results in Shafer and Vovk (2001)
assert that Sceptic has strategies that achieve certain goals. If Sceptic can
achieve a goal even when Reality and Forecaster do their worst against
him as a team, he can also achieve it when Reality is indifferent to the
game and Forecaster has no advance knowledge of how Reality will be-
have. Allowing Forecaster and Reality to play as a team makes our results
worst-case results.
2. The framework does not require that Forecaster’s move on the nth round
be derived from a probability measure for x1x2 . . . specified in advance of
the game. On the contrary, when deciding how to move on the nth round,
Forecaster may use any new information and any new ideas that come his
way by that time.
3. Instead of giving Sceptic the goal of making his capital tend to infinity (so
that Forecaster’s goal is to keep it from tending to infinity), we sometimes
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give Sceptic the goal of making his capital unbounded (so that Forecaster’s
goal is to keep it bounded). The two formulations are equivalent for our
purposes, because if Sceptic has a strategy that guarantees his capital
will be unbounded, then he has a strategy that guarantees it will tend to
infinity. (See the last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 3.) We will not
hesitate to take advantage of this equivalence. (See, for example, the first
two bullets in Section 5.1.)
4. Many of the classical results of probability theory hold in our framework
even when Forecaster offers bets that fall short of defining probability dis-
tributions for Reality’s move. This feature of our framework is important
for applications to finance, because only a limited number of instruments
can be priced by a securities market. But we are not concerned with this
feature in the present article.
5. Finally, infinities are not essential to our story. Although we have been
talking, for brevity, about a probability forecaster’s performance being
tested by an adversary who seeks to become infinitely rich over an infinite
sequence of bets, we can also develop a more useful but more complicated
finitary picture, where the adversary seeks only to become very rich by
means of finitely many bets. See Chapters 6 and 7 of Shafer and Vovk
(2001) and Theorem 4 in Section 4 of this article.
3 The challenge to Forecaster
The work reviewed in the preceding section emphasizes what Sceptic can
achieve—how Sceptic can become infinitely rich if Reality violates various pre-
dictions. In the remainder of this article, we look at the challenge faced by
Forecaster. We know (Theorem 2) that Forecaster cannot win if Sceptic and
Reality are both working against him. But what can he achieve if Reality is
somehow neutral, paying no attention to the forecasts?
Previous authors, most recently Sandroni et al. (2003), have noted that Fore-
caster’s position can be strengthened if he is allowed to randomize his forecasts.
When he does this, he still cannot be absolutely sure of winning, but as we
will show, he can win almost surely with respect to the probabilities involved in
the randomization. We can think of the randomization as a way of hiding full
knowledge of the pn from Reality and thus assuring a measure of neutrality on
her part.
To make this story fully game-theoretic, we need a game that represents
Sceptic’s strength—the power of the internal strategies available to him—while
also representing Forecaster’s randomization. In this section, we construct such
a game. In this game, a number of strategies Sceptic might want to use are
combined into a single strategy, which makes Sceptic infinitely rich if any of
the individual strategies do. Forecaster’s randomization, on the other hand, is
represented by a subgame between him and a random number generator.
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In Subsection 3.1 we explain how Sceptic combines strategies. In Subsec-
tion 3.2, we explain the randomization subgame. In Subsection 3.3, we combine
these two ideas into a formal game. We will show that Forecaster has a winning
strategy in this game in Section 4.
3.1 Sceptic’s strength
Consider first the problem of representing Sceptic’s strength.
The most important point here is the following feature of our game:
Proposition 1 Suppose R1 and R2 are legal internal strategies for Sceptic, and
set
R = α1R1 + α2R2,
where α1 and α2 are nonnegative real numbers adding to one. Then R is also
a legal internal strategy for Sceptic, and R wins whenever R1 wins or R2 wins.
Proof An internal strategy Q for Sceptic is a function that assigns a real num-
ber to every finite sequence of moves by Forecaster and Reality of the form
p1x1 . . . pn. Such a function recursively determines a capital process L for Scep-
tic: L(2) = 1, where 2 is the empty sequence, and
L(p1x1 . . . pnxn) = L(p1x1 . . . pn−1xn−1) +R(p1x1 . . . pn)(xn − pn). (2)
The internal strategy Q is legal if and only if L is everywhere nonnegative.
Let K1, K2, and K be the capital processes for R1, R2, and R, respectively.
By (2), K = α1K1 + α2K2. It follows that (i) K is everywhere nonnegative
whenever K1 and K2 are, and thus R is legal whenever R1 and R2 are, and
(ii) on any path p1x1p2x2 . . . where K1 or K2 tends to infinity, K also tends to
infinity.
If Forecaster is considering two different legal internal strategies for Sceptic, R1
and R2, and he wants to find a strategy of his own that beats both of them,
then according to this proposition, it is enough for him to find a strategy that
beats α1R1 + α2R2. This conclusion generalizes from any pair to any finite set
of legal internal strategies and even to any countably infinite set of legal internal
strategies. It also generalizes from internal strategies to strategies that use any
other information that we can assume in advance will be available to Sceptic.
There are no more than a countable number of statistical tests we might ask
Forecaster’s probabilities to pass, and hence no more than a countable number
of legal strategies for Sceptic that Forecaster needs to counter. Indeed, as Wald
(1937) explained, there are only a countable number of sentences in any formal
language that we might use to formulate tests. But as a practical matter, we
cannot specify all the tests that interest us, and Proposition 1 depends on an
asymptotic notion of winning that loses contact with practicality when we try
to average too many strategies. The average will tend to infinity when any
of its components does, but not as fast. So we do not want to exaggerate
the significance of the possibility of averaging strategies for Sceptic. We assert
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only that in some circumstances it can allow Sceptic to capture the aspects of
randomness (including calibration) that interest us. For a closer look, see Vovk
(2005).
Because we are asking Forecaster to defeat only a single strategy for Sceptic,
we can clarify Forecaster’s task by requiring Sceptic to announce this strategy
before Forecaster moves. If the players did not receive information from outside
the game in the course of play, then we might simply require Sceptic to announce
an internal strategy for the whole game at the outset. But because our frame-
work does allow both Forecaster and Sceptic to receive information from outside
of game, and because some of this information might be unanticipated or infor-
mal, we instead require only that Sceptic announce a strategy for each round
before Forecaster moves on that round. For simplicity, we assume that this
strategy is internal at least in the sense that at the point where it is announced,
the only not-yet-received information it uses is Forecaster’s not-yet-announced
move.
The following game, which can be thought of as a subgame of the game
we will formulate in Subsection 3.3, expresses these ideas formally. It differs
from Binary Forecasting Game I in only one way: Sceptic now moves first on
each round, announcing a strategy that is bounded as a function of Forecaster’s
forthcoming move.
Forecasting Subgame
Players: Sceptic, Forecaster, Reality
Protocol:
K0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Sceptic announces a bounded function Sn : [0, 1]→ R.
Forecaster announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 + Sn(pn)(xn − pn).
Restriction on Sceptic: Sceptic must choose Sn so that his capital remains
nonnegative (Kn ≥ 0) no matter what values Forecaster and Reality announce
for pn and xn.
Winner: Sceptic wins if Kn tends to infinity.
The strategy Sn takes only the subsequent move by Forecaster, pn, into account.
But in choosing Sn, Sceptic may take into account both previous moves in the
game and any other information received before the round begins. When we say
that Sn is bounded, we mean that supp |Sn(p)| <∞. We do not require that a
uniform bound exist for all the Sn together, and we require no other regularity
of the Sn; we do not even require that they be measurable.
3.2 Allowing Forecaster to randomize
In our purely game-theoretic approach, the notion that Forecaster moves ran-
domly must also be represented game-theoretically. We can do this by splitting
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Forecaster into two players. The first player decides on the probabilities and
sets up the randomizing device (this is the role of a person who constructs and
spins a roulette wheel); the second player then decides on the outcome of the
randomization (this is the role of the roulette wheel). Calling the first player
Forecaster and the second Random Number Generator, we can describe their
interaction in terms of a game analogous to our Binary Forecasting Game I:
Randomization Subgame
Players: Forecaster, Random Number Generator
Protocol:
F0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Forecaster announces Pn ∈ P[0, 1].
Forecaster announces fn : [0, 1]→ R such that
∫
fndPn ≤ 0.
Random Number Generator announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Fn := Fn−1 + fn(pn).
Restriction on Forecaster: Forecaster must choose Pn and fn so that his
capital remains nonnegative (Fn ≥ 0) no matter what value Random Number
Generator announces for pn.
Winner: Forecaster wins if his capital Fn tends to infinity.
The fn must be measurable; this is needed in order for the integral to be defined.
But as we will see when we prove Theorem 3 in Section 4, Forecaster can achieve
what we want him to achieve even if we put much stronger restrictions on the
fn; e.g., we can require that they be continuous and piece-wise linear.
On the first of his two moves on the nth round, Forecaster announces a
probability distribution Pn for pn. On the second, he sets up the randomizing
device, by making bets that force Random Number Generator to make pn look
random with respect to Pn. He bets by choosing a gamble fn that is either fair
(
∫
fndPn = 0) or unfavourable to him (
∫
fndPn < 0). If Forecaster gets in-
finitely rich with such bets, then we will think that Random Number Generator
has done a bad job—i.e., has not made his p1, p2, . . . look like draws from the
sequence P1, P2, . . . of probability measures.
We will adopt Cournot’s principle for the Randomization Subgame. We will
assume, that is to say, that Random Number Generator will do a good job,
playing so that Fn necessarily stays bounded.
3.3 The game to challenge Forecaster
Combining our two ideas—announcing Sceptic’s strategy at the outset of
each round and randomizing the probability forecasts—we obtain a perfect-
information game involving four players:
Binary Forecasting Game II
Players: Sceptic, Forecaster, Reality, Random Number Generator
Protocol:
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K0 := 1.
F0 := 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Sceptic announces a bounded function Sn : [0, 1]→ R.
Forecaster announces Pn ∈ P[0, 1].
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Forecaster announces fn : [0, 1]→ R such that
∫
fndPn ≤ 0.
Random Number Generator announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Kn := Kn−1 + Sn(pn)(xn − pn).
Fn := Fn−1 + fn(pn).
Restriction on Sceptic: Sceptic must choose Sn so that his capital remains
nonnegative (Kn ≥ 0) no matter how the other players move.
Restriction on Forecaster: Forecaster must choose Pn and fn so that his
capital remains nonnegative (Fn ≥ 0) no matter how the other players move.
Winner: Forecaster wins if either (i) his capital Fn tends to infinity or (ii)
Sceptic’s capital Kn stays bounded.
As we explained when we described the subgames in the preceding subsections,
the game puts no restrictions on Sn or fn aside from the requirements that each
Sn be bounded and each fn be measurable.
If Random Number Generator does a good job in the game (Fn does not
tend to infinity), then Forecaster wins the game if and only if Sceptic does not
detect any disagreement between Forecaster and Reality (Kn stays bounded). In
the next section, we prove that Forecaster has a winning strategy. If Forecaster
uses this strategy, then Random Number Generator can guarantee that the pn
are good probability forecasts for the xn just by making sure that they look like
random draws from the Pn.
In the protocol as we have set it up, Random Number Generator actually
announces pn after Reality announces xn, and this makes it awkward to think
of pn as a probability forecast of xn. But our result (Forecaster has a winning
strategy) is not affected if we make an exception to our presumption of perfect
information by supposing that Random Number Generator sees the xn later or
perhaps never at all, and this should not hamper his ability to make the pn look
like random draws from the Pn. We will return to this point in Section 5.1,
where we recast the protocol so that xn is announced after pn.
One might also worry that the protocol grants too much to Sceptic and
Reality. We could tie Sceptic down more by requiring him to announce an
internal strategy for the entire game at the outset. We could make the neutrality
of Reality more explicit by requiring her to choose her entire sequence of moves
x1x2 . . . before play begins, even though she announces these moves to the
other players according to the indicated schedule. But because Forecaster has a
winning strategy in the game as laid out, there is no point in changing the game
to strengthen Forecaster’s hand. Forecaster’s winning strategy will remain a
winning strategy when the other players are weakened.
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4 Good probability forecasts
Theorem 3 Forecaster has a winning internal strategy in Binary Forecasting
Game II.
Proof Imagine for a moment that Forecaster and Reality play the following
zero-sum game on round n after Sceptic announces the bounded function Sn:
Game on Round n
Players: Forecaster, Reality
Protocol:
Simultaneously:
Forecaster announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Payoffs: Forecaster loses (and Reality gains) Sn(pn)(xn − pn).
The value of this game is at most zero, because for any mixed strategy Q for
Reality (any probability measure Q on {0, 1}), Forecaster can limit Reality’s
expected gain to zero by choosing pn := Q{1}. In order to apply von Neumann’s
minimax theorem, which requires that the move spaces be finite, we replace
Forecaster’s move space [0, 1] with a finite subset An of [0, 1]. Fixing ² > 0
and using the boundedness of Sn, we choose An dense enough in [0, 1] that the
value of the game is smaller than ²2−n. The minimax theorem then tells us that
Forecaster has a mixed strategy Pn (a probability measure on [0, 1] concentrated
on An) such that ∫
Sn(p)(x− p)Pn(dp) ≤ ²2−n (3)
for both x = 0 and x = 1.
Returning now to Binary Forecasting Game II, consider the strategy for
Forecaster that tells him, on round n, to use the Pn just identified and to use
as his second move the function fn given by
fn(p) :=
1
1 + ²
(
Sn(p)(xn − p)− ²2−n
)
for p ∈ An and defined arbitrarily for p /∈ An. (This allows Forecaster to make
fn continuous and piece-wise linear if he wishes.) The condition
∫
fndPn ≤ 0 is
then guaranteed by (3). Comparing the sums
Kn = 1 +
n∑
i=1
Si(pi)(xi − pi)
and
Fn = 1 + 11 + ²
n∑
i=1
(
Si(pi)(xi − pi)− ²2−i
)
,
we see that
(1 + ²)Fn = Kn + ²2−n,
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so that Kn ≤ (1 + ²)Fn. This establishes that Fn is never negative and that
either Kn will stay bounded or Fn will be unbounded.
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that for every legal strategy T for
Forecaster, we can construct another legal strategy T ∗ such that whenever T ’s
capital is unbounded, T ∗’s tends to infinity. This is easy to do. We choose some
number larger than 1, say 2. Starting, as the game requires, with initial capital
1 for Forecaster, we have him play T until its capital exceeds 2. Then he sets
aside 1 of this capital and continues with a rescaled version of T , scaled down to
the reduced capital. (This means he multiplies T ’s moves on succeeding rounds
by the same factor as he has multiplied the capital at this point, thus assuring
that the capital on succeeding rounds is also multiplied by this factor.) When
the capital again exceeds 2, he again sets aside 1, and so forth. The money set
aside, which is part of the capital earned by this strategy, grows without bound.
For another way of constructing T ∗ from T , see Shafer and Vovk (2001), p. 68.
The essential idea of this proof—the application of von Neumann’s minimax
theorem—was used by several of the authors who worked on properly calibrated
randomized forecasting, including Hart (Foster and Vohra 1998, pp. 383–384),
Fudenberg and Levine (1999), and Sandroni et al. (2003). In Appendix A, we
show that Theorem 1 implies the result obtained by Sandroni et al. (2003), the
strongest result on properly calibrated randomized forecasting of which we are
aware.
Like the results of previous authors, Theorem 3 generalizes beyond the case
where Reality’s moves are binary. Our proof generalizes directly to the case
where Reality’s move space Ω is a finite set, and the argument can probably
also be extended to yet other games considered by Shafer and Vovk (2001).
Whereas previous work on properly calibrated forecasting seems to be es-
sentially asymptotic (and has been criticized on this account; see Schervish’s
comment in Oakes (1985)), our game-theoretic result is not. We stated Theo-
rem 3 in asymptotic form, but in the course of proving it, we also established a
finitary result:
Theorem 4 For any ² > 0, Forecaster has a strategy in Binary Forecasting
Game II that guarantees Kn ≤ (1 + ²)Fn for each n.
Forecaster can guarantee Fn ≥ Kn to any approximation required, which means
that every dollar gained by Sceptic can be attributed to the poor performance
of Random Number Generator.
5 Discussion
Theorems 3 and 4 say that if you have a good random number generator, you
can do a good job forecasting probabilistically how reality will behave. In this
concluding section, we elaborate this message and its implications for how we
think about stochasticity.
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5.1 Variations on the game
We can vary Binary Forecasting Game II in several ways without losing its
intuitive message. Here we look at a couple of variations that may be helpful
to some readers.
Two games at once
The rule for winning in Binary Forecasting Game II treats the game as a single
game involving four players. We could just as well, however, return to the picture
developed in Section 3, in which Random Number Generator is simultaneously
participating in two different games by announcing the pn. All the players are
in the same protocol—the protocol in Binary Forecasting Game II—but there
are two games because there are two rules for winning:
• Against Forecaster, Random Number Generator is playing the Random-
ization Subgame we described in Section 3.2. Random Number Generator
wins this game if and only if Fn stays bounded (so that the pn look ran-
dom with respect to the Pn). (Recall point 3 at the end of Section 2
concerning the equivalence of requiring that a player’s capital not tend to
infinity and requiring that it be bounded.)
• Against Sceptic, Random Number Generator is playing the Forecasting
Subgame (in the role we gave to Forecaster when we first described that
game on p. 9), which he wins if and only if Kn stays bounded (so that the
xn look random with respect to the pn).
Because we have not changed the protocol for Binary Forecasting Game II, it
remains true that Forecaster has a strategy that guarantees Kn ≤ (1+ ²)Fn for
all n (Theorem 4). By playing this strategy, Forecaster guarantees that Random
Number Generator wins the Forecasting Subgame whenever Random Number
Generator wins the Randomization Subgame.
Putting xn after pn
As we have already mentioned, one counter-intuitive feature of Binary Fore-
casting Game II is that pn is announced after the outcome xn it is supposed to
predict. Here is a way of changing the protocol so that xn comes last, where it
seems to belong.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Sceptic announces a bounded function Sn : [0, 1]→ R.
Forecaster announces Pn ∈ P[0, 1].
Forecaster announces, for x = 0 and x = 1,
fxn : [0, 1]→ R such that
∫
fxndPn ≤ 0.
Random Number Generator announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
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Kn := Kn−1 + Sn(pn)(xn − pn).
Fn := Fn−1 + fxnn (pn).
Changing the protocol in this way does not invalidate the conclusion that
Forecaster has a winning strategy. In order to see this, we need to think sepa-
rately about two changes and why they do not weaken Forecaster:
• Forecaster now makes his second move before Reality announces xn. In-
stead of waiting to see xn and then announcing fn, Forecaster announces
a strategy for how fn will depend on xn.
• Random Number Generator announces pn before Reality announces xn.
A winning strategy remains a winning strategy when it is announced, in whole
or in part, in advance. So it does not weaken Forecaster to announce how fn
will depend on xn. Nor can the order in which Forecaster’s opponents make
their moves after he is finished diminish what he can achieve.
This version of the protocol helps us see that the randomization is a way of
requiring Reality’s neutrality. Intuitively, Reality’s moves x1x2 . . . have nothing
to do with how well Random Number Generator can simulate random draws
from announced probability measures on [0, 1]. But if Forecaster makes fn de-
pend on xn, Reality may be able to choose the xn so that Random Number
Generator fails Forecaster’s test. When we adopt Cournot’s principle for the
Randomization Subgame, we are assuming Reality will not behave in this ma-
licious way.
5.2 Is randomization really needed?
Theorem 2 seems to establish that Forecaster cannot win against Sceptic without
the randomization we have studied in this article. It may be unreasonable,
however, to ask Forecaster to defeat the extremely precise collaboration between
Sceptic and Reality in the example we used to prove Theorem 2. Is it not
possible that Forecaster might succeed without randomization if we ask him
only to defeat more reasonable strategies by Sceptic?
One reasonable thing for Sceptic to do is to test for calibration. The tradi-
tional way of checking calibration is to divide the range of the forecasts, [0, 1],
into a large number of small intervals and to check whether the average of the
xn for the pn in each interval itself falls in or near that interval. We can easily
translate this into a strategy for Sceptic in Binary Forecasting Game I. Say we
use 4 intervals: [0, 0.25), [0.25, 0.5), [0.5, 0.75), [0.75, 1]. Let R be the strategy
constructed for Sceptic in Proposition 3.3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), which
keeps his capital nonnegative and makes him infinitely rich unless
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=1(xi − pi)
n
= 0. (4)
Suppose Sceptic runs 4 copies of R/4; copy 1 on the rounds where pn ∈ [0, 0.25)
(pretending the other rounds do not happen), copy 2 on the rounds where
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pn ∈ [0.25, 0.5) (again pretending the other rounds to not happen), etc. Then
Reality can defeat Forecaster by always choosing
xn :=
{
1 if pn < 0.5
0 otherwise.
This is in the spirit of examples discussed by Oakes, Dawid and Schervish (1985),
who conclude that many sequences of outcomes cannot be predicted probabilis-
tically by a computable theory.
Even this example can be questioned, however. A strategy for Sceptic that
requires him to distinguish whether pn < 0.25 or pn ≥ 0.25 may be reasonable
from a mathematical point of view, but it is not reasonable from a computational
point of view. It is not continuous in pn, and so it cannot really be implemented.
It is not computable.
The fact that only continuous functions are computable, together with the
fact that the strategies for Sceptic that we studied in Shafer and Vovk (2001)
are continuous, suggests that we study a version of Binary Forecasting Game II
in which Sceptic’s move Sn is required to be continuous. Recent work by Vovk,
Takemura, and Shafer (2005) shows that Forecaster can win such a game without
randomization.
5.3 The meaning of stochasticity
We have shown that good randomized probability forecasting for a sequence
x1x2 . . . is always possible. If Forecaster is allowed to announce his probability
pn for each xn after observing x1x2 . . . xn−1, and he is allowed to randomize
when choosing these probabilities, then he can make sure that they pass a given
battery of statistical tests. This shows that probability theory applies broadly to
the real world. But this breadth of applicability undermines some conceptions
of stochasticity. If everything is stochastic to a good approximation, then the
bare concept of stochasticity has limited content.
There is content in the assertion that a sequence obeys a probability dis-
tribution P that we specify fully before any observation. The assertion can be
refuted when the sequence is observed, and if it is not refuted then Forecaster
can avoid refutation himself only by agreeing with P ’s predictions in the limit
(Vovk and Shafer 2004; Dawid 1984, p. 281). But there seems to be very little
content in the assertion that a sequence is governed by a completely unknown
probability distribution.
When he follows the strategy suggested by the proof of Theorem 3, is Fore-
caster using experience of the past to predict the future? He is certainly taking
the past into consideration. Sceptic’s moves signal emerging discrepancies that
he would like to take advantage of, and Forecaster chooses his ps to avoid ex-
tending these discrepancies. But because he succeeds regardless of the xs, it
is awkward to call Forecaster’s ps predictions. Perhaps we should call them
descriptions of the past rather than predictions of the future.
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Kolmogorov once expressed puzzlement about the appearance in the real
world of the kind of irregularity described by probability (Kolmogorov 1983,
p. 1):
In everyday language we call random those phenomena where
we cannot find a regularity allowing us to predict precisely their re-
sults. Generally speaking there is no ground to believe that random
phenomena should possess any definite probability. Therefore, we
should have distinguished between randomness proper (as absence
of any regularity) and stochastic randomness (which is the subject
of the probability theory).
There emerges a problem of finding the reasons for applicability
of the mathematical theory of probability to the phenomena of the
real world.
But when probability is used in a way that succeeds regardless of how events
turn out, we do not need to look farther to find reasons for its success.
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A Properly calibrated randomized forecasting
As we explained in the introduction to this article, the work on randomized
forecasting by Foster and Vohra (1998), Fudenberg and Levine (1999), Lehrer
(2001), and Sandroni et al. (2003) demonstrated only the existence of random-
ized forecasts with certain calibration properties. Foster and Vohra showed that
the whole sequence of forecasts can be made properly calibrated, and the other
authors showed that subsequences of forecasts selected by certain rules can also
be made properly calibrated. In this appendix, we show that our Theorem 3,
together with a game-theoretic strong law of large numbers that we proved in
Shafer and Vovk (2001), implies the existence of randomized forecasts that are
properly calibrated even with respect to the widest possible class of rules for
selecting subsequences. For brevity, we continue to consider only the binary
case.
Selecting subsequences can be more complicated in probability forecast-
ing than in von Mises’s theory, because we can use p1x1 . . . pn−1xn−1pn, not
merely x1 . . . xn−1, when deciding whether to include the nth trial in the sub-
sequence. Among our predecessors, however, only Sandroni et al. went beyond
x1 . . . xn−1, and they used only x1 . . . xn−1 and pn, still ignoring the prior fore-
casts p1, . . . , pn−1. We will be as broad as possible, allowing rules that use all
the internal information p1x1 . . . pn−1xn−1pn.
Let us write U for the set of all sequences of the form p1x1 . . . pn−1xn−1pn.
We call any measurable function F : U → {0, 1} a selection rule; we interpret it
by including the nth round in the subsequence when F (p1x1 . . . pn−1xn−1pn) =
1. We say that an infinite sequence of forecasts p1p2 . . . is properly calibrated
with respect to a selection rule F on a path x1x2 . . . if
∞∑
n=1
F (p1x1 . . . pn−1xn−1pn) <∞ (5)
or
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=1 F (p1x1 . . . pi−1xi−1pi)(xi − pi)∑n
i=1 F (p1x1 . . . pi−1xi−1pi)
= 0. (6)
Let us write V for the set of all sequences of the form p1x1 . . . pnxn. A
forecasting system is a measurable function ζ : V → P[0, 1]. Given a path
s = x1x2 . . . , we define ζs : [0, 1]∗ → P[0, 1] by
ζs(p1, . . . , pn−1, pn) := ζ(p1x1 . . . pnxn).
By Ionescu-Tulcea’s extension theorem (Shiryaev 1996, Section II.9), there exists
a unique probability measure ζ∗s on [0, 1]
∞ having ζs(p1, . . . , pn) as a conditional
distribution for pn+1 given p1, . . . , pn for n = 0, 1, . . . . We say that ζ is properly
calibrated with respect to a selection rule F on a path s if ζ∗s -almost every
forecast sequence p1p2 . . . is properly calibrated with respect to F on s; we say
that ζ is properly calibrated with respect to F if it is properly calibrated with
respect to F on every path s.
19
The following theorem, which we prove using Theorem 3, can also be proven
using the methods of Sandroni et al. Technically, it is stronger than Proposition
1 of Sandroni et al., because they use, unnecessarily, a notion of selection rule
that is less general than ours.
Theorem 5 Given an arbitrary countable collection of selection rules, there
exists a forecasting scheme that is properly calibrated with respect to all the
rules in the collection.
Proof Let C be a countable collection of selection rules. For each selection rule
F in C, fix a strategy RF for Sceptic in Binary Forecasting Game I that is legal
and makes him infinitely rich if neither (5) nor (6) holds. Such a strategy RF
can be constructed in an almost trivial way from the winning strategy RSLLN
for Sceptic we constructed in Section 3.3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) to prove the
game-theoretic strong law of large numbers in the bounded forecasting game
studied there; we simply ignore any round n in Binary Forecasting Game I
for which F (p1x1 . . . pn−1xn−1pn) = 0. More precisely, RF tells Sceptic to set
Mn equal to zero whenever F (p1x1 . . . pn−1xn−1pn) = 0 and to use RSLLN’s
recommendation for round k of the bounded forecasting game on the round of
Binary Forecasting Game I for which F (p1x1 . . . pn−1xn−1pn) 6= 0 for the kth
time.
By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), Sceptic can average
the RF for F ∈ C to obtain a legal strategy R in Binary Forecasting Game I
that makes him infinitely rich whenever any of the RF does so. This strategy R
makes him infinitely rich if there is any F in C for which neither (5) nor (6) holds.
It can be chosen measurable. Since it is known in advance, it can be translated
into Sceptic’s strategy in Binary Forecasting Game II. This makes Forecaster’s
winning strategy in Binary Forecasting Game II (which exists by Theorem 1)
a function of only Reality’s and Random Number Generator’s moves—i.e., a
forecasting system. Call it ζ.
To complete the proof, we need to check that ζ is properly calibrated with
respect to all F ∈ C on all s = x1x2 . . . . In other words, for each s and
each F , we need to show that ζ∗s -almost all forecast sequences p1, p2, . . . are
properly calibrated with respect to F on s. But lack of proper calibration leads
to Sceptic becoming infinitely rich, and by Theorem 3, this leads to Forecaster
also becoming infinitely rich. And since Forecaster’s capital is a supermartingale
with respect to ζ∗s , Forecaster becomes infinitely rich with probability zero.
B Forecasting under stochasticity
Suppose we fix a horizon N and a function T (p1, x1, . . . , pN , xN ) for testing the
probability forecasts p1, . . . , pN . The function T takes only two values: “accept”
and “reject”. Suppose further that under any probability distribution P for
x1, . . . , xN , the probability that T accepts when P ’s conditional probabilities
are used for the pn is at least 1 − ². Sandroni (2003) shows that there is a
randomized strategy for giving the pn that makes the probability that T accepts
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at least 1− ² no matter how x1, . . . , xN come out. This is a measure-theoretic
version of our game-theoretic Theorem 4. It is weaker than Theorem 4 in several
respects:
• It assumes a fixed horizon N . (This is a minor point, because the assump-
tion that N is finite can easily be relaxed in Sandroni’s approach.)
• It assumes that Reality chooses the x1, . . . , xN randomly rather than play-
ing strategically.
• It fixes at the outset a test T based on all the forecasts and outcomes,
whereas our Sceptic can also use other information that arrives as the
game proceeds or merely change his strategy on a whim.
But it expresses in measure-theoretic terms the proposition that randomized
probability forecasts can perform as well true probabilities.
Typically, measure-theoretic counterparts can be derived from game-
theoretic results in probability (Shafer and Vovk 2001, Chapter 8). We now
demonstrate that this rule holds in the present case by deriving a simplified
version of Sandroni’s result from our Theorem 4.
Following Sandroni, we assume that the game is played for only a finite
number of rounds, say N . To avoid technicalities, we make two simplifying
assumptions:
1. We assume, as we have done throughout this article, that the outcomes
xn are binary. (Sandroni allows any finite outcome space.)
2. We assume that all probabilities are chosen from a fixed finite subset P
of [0, 1]. The forecaster is required to choose his pn from P, and the
unknown probability distribution P has all its conditional probabilities
(its probabilities for xn = 1 given x1, . . . , xn−1) in P.
Under these assumptions, our Theorem 4 holds with ² = 0.
A test T is a function that maps each sequence (p1, x1, . . . , pN , xN ) with
pn ∈ P and xn ∈ {0, 1} to 0 or 1. We interpret T = 1 to mean that the test
rejects the pn (this reverses Sandroni’s convention). The test does not reject the
truth with probability 1− ² if, for any probability distribution P on {0, 1}N with
conditional probabilities in P, the P -probability that T (p1, x1, . . . , pN , xN ) = 1,
where pn is the conditional P -probability that xn = 1 given x1, . . . , xn−1, does
not exceed ². The test can be passed with probability 1 − ² if there exists a
forecasting system (in the sense of the preceding appendix but with the pn
restricted to P) ζ such that, for any path s = x1, . . . , xN ,
ζ∗s
{
(p1, . . . , pN ) ∈ [0, 1]N |T (p1, x1, . . . , pN , xN ) = 1
} ≤ ²,
where ζ∗s is defined as in the preceding appendix but with n restricted not to
exceed N .
Corollary 1 If a test does not reject the truth with probability 1− ² then it can
be passed with probability 1− ².
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Proof Let T be a test that does not reject the truth with probability 1− ². We
use it to define a martingale K as follows: define a function K′(p1, x1, . . . , pn, xn),
where n = 0, 1, . . . , N , pi ∈ [0, 1], and xi ∈ {0, 1}, by the requirements
K′(p1, x1, . . . , pN , xN ) := T (p1, x1, . . . , pN , xN )
and
K′(p1, x1, . . . , pn, xn) :=
max
p∈P
(pK′(p1, x1, . . . , pn, xn, p, 1) + (1− p)K′(p1, x1, . . . , pn, xn, p, 0))
for n = N−1, N−2, . . . , 1, 0. Since T does not reject the truth with probability
1 − ², K′(2) ≤ ². It is easy to see that K := K′/K′(2) is a capital process
of some strategy in Binary Forecasting Game I in which Sceptic is allowed to
throw part of his money away at each trial. Consider the corresponding strategy
(i.e., the strategy with the same Mn) in which Sceptic keeps all his money at
each trial; this determines Sceptic’s strategy in Binary Forecasting Game II
(Sn(p) is Sceptic’s move in Binary Forecasting Game I made in response to
p1, x1, . . . , pn−1, xn−1, p). Consider also the randomized strategy for Random
Number Generator that draws pn ∈ P randomly from Pn at each trial and the
deterministic strategy for Reality that outputs a fixed sequence s = (x1, . . . , xN )
of moves. Let ζ be the part of Forecaster’s winning strategy that produces
Pn (in the game with the goal Fn ≥ Kn for all n; cf. Theorem 4) as played
against these strategies for Sceptic, Random Number Generator, and Reality.
Because Fn ≥ Kn, Fn is a nonnegative supermartingale with respect to ζ∗s , and
it starts at 1. So Doob’s inequality implies that ζ∗s gives the event FN ≥ 1/²
probability at most ². It follows that ² is also an upper bound for the probability
that KN ≥ 1/² and hence for the probability that K′N ≥ 1 and hence for the
probability that T (p1, x1, . . . , pN , xN ) = 1.
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